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Abstract—Smart grid network facilitates reliable and efficient power generation and transmission. The power system can adjust the
amount of electricity generated based on power usage information submitted by end users. Sender authentication and user privacy
preservation are two important security issues on this information flow. In this paper, we propose a scheme such that even the control
center (power operator) does not know which user makes the requests of using more power or agreements of using less power until the
power is actually used. At the end of each billing period (i.e., after electricity usage), the end user can prove to the power operator that it
has really requested to use more power or agreed to use less power earlier. To reduce the total traffic volume in the communications
network, our scheme allows gateway smart meters to help aggregate power usage information, and the power generators to determine
the total amount of power that needs to be generated at different times. To reduce the impact of attacking traffic, our scheme allows
gateway smart meters to help filter messages before they reach the control center. Through analysis and experiments, we show that
our scheme is both effective and efficient.
Index Terms—Smart grid network, authentication, privacy preserving, commitment, homomorphic encryption, bloom filter
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE smart grid network is considered as the next genera-tion power supply network which facilitates reliable
and effective transmission of electricity from power genera-
tors to end users. In this network, the amount of electricity
generated can be adjusted based on the real-time demand of
end users in two ways. First, for big users such as factories,
on top of the basic level of power supply, they can express
additional power request one day, one week, one month or
even one year ahead. The power operator then imposes
additional charge to them. Second, for all end users, the
power operator publishes a discount table one day, one
week, one month or even one year ahead such that if an end
user can reduce certain level of power usage in the forth-
coming period, it can get a discount in its electricity bill.
Thus the end user expresses its power reduction plan (espe-
cially for the usage of electric appliances which consume
lots of power) as a response. Both ways are very common in
United States and European countries. They not only ensure
that user demands are satisfied but also avoids excess elec-
tricity generation. The latter can in turn help increase the
profit of the power operators and protect the environment.
In the future, a smart grid network may also facilitate big
end users to sell requested but unused electricity to other
end users in the market.
The additional power request and power reduction plan
can be considered as contracts between end users and the
power operator. Then how can the power operator ensure
that they are actually enforced? This is challenging because
the communications network is independent of the power
transmission network and due to the physical properties of
power transmission, an end user can pull any amount of
power from the grid anyway. One common approach is to
make use of the smart meters installed at end users’ houses
or factories. At the end of each billing period, the power
operator compares an end user’s actual power usage (being
recorded by its smart meter) with the contracted amount to
see whether they match. If not, the power operator imposes
a fine or just cancels the agreed discount for the end user.
For the case of additional power request, this discourages
an end user from requesting too much or using more power
than requested. For the case of power reduction, this means
an end user must reduce the power usage as contracted in
order to get a discount.
Two recent works [1] and [2] proposed a comprehensive
and hierarchical structure for smart grid communications.
There are home area networks (HANs) at the user end, build-
ing area networks (BANs) at the building feeder and neigh-
borhood area networks (NANs) among substations. A NAN
is formed by a large number of BANs while a BAN is formed
by a large number of HANs. Note that BANs may not exist
in some real-world advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
deployments nowadays but we emphasize that our pro-
posed scheme still works even without the aggregation
at BANs. A simplified architecture of the communications
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network (ignoring the power generation and distribution
network here) is shown in Fig. 1.
Basically, there is one control center, belonging to the
power operator and located at the power plant, connected
to multiple substation areas. Note that if there are distrib-
uted energy resources, this control center becomes the con-
trolling unit of the so called virtual power plants [3] which
integrate various distributed energy resources. Each substa-
tion area contains one NAN gateway smart meter connect-
ing to buildings. Each building contains one BAN gateway
smart meter connecting to houses. Each house in turn con-
tains one household (or HAN gateway) smart meter con-
necting to all electric appliances in the house. Each BAN
gateway smart meter will collect additional power request
messages and power reduction plans from household smart
meters, aggregate them and forward them to the NAN gate-
way smart meter. Similarly, each NAN gateway smart
meter will collect messages from BAN gateway smart
meters and forward them to the control center. Each BAN
gateway also lets household smart meters download the
up-to-date daily, weekly, monthly or yearly discount table
so that an end user can make the power reduction plan in
the forthcoming period accordingly. In terms of communi-
cations technologies, a household smart meter communi-
cates with a BAN gateway smart meter (i.e., HAN-BAN
connection) using Wi-Fi while a BAN gateway smart meter
communicates with a NAN gateway smart meter (i.e.,
BAN-NAN connection) using WiMax. A NAN gateway
smart meter at a substation in turn communicates with the
control center using the supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) [4] system.
Unlike the kWh meters in the traditional power network,
household smart meters can push information about an end
user to gateway smart meters and then to the control center.
There are many discussions about the functionalities of
household smart meters. In general, we assume that a house-
hold smart meter can communicate with the electric applian-
ces or electric machines using HAN (which usually adapts
the Zigbee protocol), predict or project the overall electricity
requirements of the household or the factory, and let end
users input its daily, weekly, monthly or yearly power usage
plans. It then forwards the information to the BAN gateway
smart meter. Overall speaking, it can be regarded as an
intelligent device with adequate amount of computational
power. Readersmay refer to [5] and [6] for more details.
In this paper, we focus on two major security issues of
the communication between a gateway smart meter and the
household smart meters in its region of responsibility. For
the communications between the control center and NAN
gateway smart meters, some security measures are already
in place in the extended version of SCADA [7] and so we
will skip this part due to space limitations. Information flow
between individual household smart meters and gateway
smart meters (and then between gateway smart meters and
the control center) has a big impact on the reliability of
power supply and is related to the charges for the end users.
Security issues in a smart grid system (referred to as cyber
security [8]) must not be overlooked. In particular, sender
authentication and user privacy preservation are two major
concerns [9].
The additional power request messages and power
reduction plans sent by end user smart meters are used by
the control center (the power operator) to determine how
much electricity to generate in the forthcoming period and
how to balance the load of different power generators. If the
messages are not authenticated to confirm that they are
from valid registered users, attackers can easily launch an
illegal packet flooding attack1 that can seriously affect the
availability of the service. Unlike traditional kWh meters
which only record the cumulative amount of electricity
used, household smart meters transmit additional power
requests or power reduction plans to substations via the
communications network. As a result, future electricity
usage patterns of end users can be easily traced and leaked.
Such privacy leakage can then be used to reveal the daily
habits of the end user such as when he/she is not at home
or when a factory is in operation. This privacy preservation
issue has been raised in both [9] and [11]. A proper privacy-
preserving mechanism has to be adopted.
To tackle both issues is not trivial and subject to the fol-
lowing challenges. First, most data communications in a
smart grid network are time critical. Any delay may result
in the consumer experiencing electricity interruption.
According to [8], the power generator system only has a
few seconds to receive data from substations in each period.
Any security schemes added to the system should be effi-
cient in terms of computational complexity. While the iden-
tity of a sender needs to be authenticated, we have to
preserve the privacy of the end users, and we do not want
the power operator and the substations to be able to know
how an end user will use power in the forthcoming period.
Thus, techniques to enable a substation to authenticate and
aggregate messages without knowing the actual contents
and to enable the power operator to know the accumulated
power demand in the forthcoming period are required.
In this paper, we utilize the hierarchical structure of
smart grid and propose a novel Privacy-preserving Record-
ing and Gateway-assisted Authentication (PRGA) of power
Fig. 1. Hierarchical architecture of smart grid.
1. We remark that for other distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks in which the packets are seemingly from valid users, we need to
employ other techniques to protect the system [10]. This is also an
important topic that requires more investigation, but is not the focus of
this paper.
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usage information for smart grid. We focus on the subsys-
tem that connects gateway smart meters to end users. Our
scheme has the following security features:
1) Gateway smart meters, which are physically more
secure from being attacked, are responsible for basic
authentication and aggregation of messages sent by
user smart meters on their way to the control center.
This can help ensure the availability of the power
system (by filtering illegal packets) and reduce the
traffic loading (by aggregating messages) in the com-
munications network. The techniques of hash-based
message authentication code (HMAC) and homo-
morphic encryption are used.
2) The real identity of any user smart meter and the
power usage plans sent by it are kept secret even
from the control center before the power is actu-
ally used. That means except for the end user, no
one in this world knows how he/she will use
power in the forthcoming period. We make this
possible by encryption.
3) At the end of each billing period, the power operator
can compare an end user’s actual power usage
(being recorded by its smart meter) with the con-
tracted amount to see whether they match. We make
this possible using the concept of commitment.
To summarize, we are going to propose a scheme such
that the control center can record an end user’s additional
power request or power reduction plan anonymously. That
is, even the power operator does not know how an end user
will use power in advance. At the end of each billing period
(i.e., after electricity usage), the end user can prove to the
power operator that it has really made the additional power
request or power reduction plan, together with the amount
concerned. To reduce the traffic loading in the communica-
tions network, our scheme also allows gateway smart
meters to aggregate messages such that power generators
can know the total amount of power that needs to be gener-
ated at different times. Note that the power operator as well
as the gateway smart meters do not know and do not need
to know the exact power usage pattern of each end user in
advance. It is because in the electricity distribution mecha-
nism, they only need to know the total amount of electricity
required and the power level to be maintained at each point
of the power grid at each moment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related
work is reviewed in Section 2. The system model and the
problem statement are described in Section 3. Basic crypto-
graphic concepts are summarized in Section 4. Our schemes
are presented in Section 5. Security analysis and perfor-
mance of our scheme are presented in Sections 6 and 8,
respectively, and we conclude in Section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
The smart grid project was initiated by the European Union
in 2003 [12]. At around the same time, the IntelliGrid project
[13] was started by the Electric Power Research Institute of
the USA, while the US DOE started the Grid 2030 project
[14]. Under the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) is responsible for coordinating the development of a
framework for information management to achieve interop-
erability of smart grid devices. In 2010, NIST released a
report [8] which describes the potential components of a
smart grid. Some security issues (which they define as cyber
security) are also discussed.
A recent work [15] elaborates on the importance of a
smart grid especially with the consideration of renewable
energy resources. A control model known as risk-limiting
dispatch is adopted. Some new requirements of the commu-
nication architecture and potential security problems are
identified. As such, there is an urgent need to establish pro-
tocols and standards for the smart grid.
In terms of security, the major issues are discussed in
details in [9] and [11]. For the generator-to-substation com-
munication, some security measures are already in place in
the extended version of SCADA [7]. For the substation-to-
smart-meter communication, sender authentication and
user privacy preservation are considered as two major con-
cerns as discussed earlier. A key objective of sender authen-
tication is to avoid the so-called false data injection (i.e., an
attacker injects a large volume of data into the control center
in order to disturb its normal operation and to perform
some sort of denial of service attack). In the old days, the
research community usually adopts state estimation (i.e.,
finding out abnormality in the current state from previous
ones) to identity false data being injected into a network.
However, it was recently proved that this approach can eas-
ily be compromised [16]. Even if such a state estimation
approach can be implemented, it is not appropriate for a
smart grid system. Requiring the control center to perform
state estimation implies that the control center needs to han-
dle a large volume of valid and invalid data. Obviously, this
violates the strict data reception assumption of the control
center (recall that the control center only has a few seconds
in each period for receiving data). In two recent efforts [1]
and [2], the authors proposed a simple authentication
scheme. After initial authentication using conventional pub-
lic key infrastructure (PKI), any two parties in HANs, BANs
or NANs can establish a shared key using the Diffie-Hell-
man technique. They then use that shared key to create
HMAC signature for all ongoing communications. How-
ever, privacy issues are not addressed at all. In a recent
work [17], a set of privacy-preserving protocols is proposed
for a user to combine smart meter readings with a certified
tariff policy to generate an electricity bill, which is then
transmitted to the service provider together with a zero-
knowledge proof to ensure its correctness and to avoid
information leakage. Although this work also adopts com-
mitment schemes like ours, it only handles the submission
of smart meter readings. It is difficult to directly apply it to
handle the submission of power usage plans. Note that
power usage plans are important as they may show impor-
tant deviations of power usage of the users and thus they
need to be well protected.
Smart meters, especially end-user smart meters, are more
vulnerable to physical disturbance and compromise since
they are located at end-users’ homes or factories and the
power operator has no way to keep an eye on them. In fact,
some attacks on smart meters have already been identified
[18], [19], [20]. To secure smart meters, researchers follow
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two major directions. One is based on software protection
and attestation schemes like [21]. The other is based on a
trusted platform module (TPM) [22] which is attached to
the smart meter for storing secret information such as keys.
This TPM is assumed to be tamper-resistant such that infor-
mation stored in it cannot be read or modified easily. In this
paper, we also assume the existence of such a TPM plat-
form. Nevertheless, even if such smart meter attacks take
place, our proposed scheme also provides a backdoor solu-
tion. In particular, our scheme allows the control center to
“isolate” a seemingly compromised smart meter by not
allowing it to obtain the updated master secret. For details,
please refer to Section 5.5.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we discuss our assumptions and security
requirements in details.
3.1 System Model and Assumptions
Recall that we consider a smart grid network as a hierarchi-
cal architecture. There are home area networks at the user
end, building area networks at the building feeder and
neighborhood area networks among substations. A NAN is
formed by a large number of BANs while a BAN is formed
by a large number of HANs (see Fig. 1). Basically, there is
one control center, belonging to the power operator and
located at the power plant, connected to multiple substation
areas. Each substation area contains one NAN gateway
smart meter connecting to buildings. Each building contains
one BAN gateway smart meter connecting to houses. Each
house in turn contains one household (or HAN gateway)
smart meter connecting to all electric appliances in the
house. It can be easily observed that these layers have differ-
ent physical security level assumptions.
1) The control center (belonging to the power operator)
is assumed to be secure and fully trusted.
2) Gateway smart meters are usually physically locked
from outside access. For example, a BAN gateway
smart meter is usually locked inside the control
room of a building while a NAN gateway smart
meter is usually locked inside the substation. These
regions are relatively more difficult to be compro-
mised by attackers. In this paper, we assume that
they are secure.
3) End-user smart meters are more vulnerable to physi-
cal disturbance and compromise since they are
located at end-users’ homes or factories and the
power operator has no way to keep an eye on them.
They are made more secure by attaching tamper-
resistant trusted platform modules to them. TPM is
assumed to be tamper-resistant such that keys stored
in them are difficult to be cracked or altered.
Without loss of generality, we assume that servers at the
control center and gateway smart meters have higher
computational power than the average home personal com-
puters. Although this may not be true for the so called
”industry computer” used in the field right now, this may
change as computers are upgraded when smart grid net-
work becomes more mature. Also we assume that any two
parties can establish a secure channel using conventional
public key infrastructure to minimize the impact of net-
work-level attacks.
3.2 Security Requirements
We aim at designing an authentication scheme to validate
messages sent by end user smart meters which are located
at end users’ homes or factories while at the same time, pre-
serve the end-users’ privacy (such as future daily electricity
usage pattern). The security requirements are summarized
as follows:
1) Power plan message authentication. The power plan
message from any household smart meter has to be
properly authenticated before they are forwarded to
and processed by the control center. Also an attacker
cannot impersonate any valid smart meter to send
out fake power plan messages.
2) Privacy preservation of future power usage plan.
Before actual power usage, no one including the con-
trol center and gateway smart meters can know how
an end-user will use power in the forthcoming
period although this information is listed in a power
usage plan.
3) Non-repudiation of power usage plan. At the end of
a billing period, an end user has to prove to the con-
trol center that its power usage plan submitted ear-
lier agrees with the actual power usage. The end
user cannot deny any power usage plan submitted
or cannot argue that it has made a certain power
usage plan which it has not actually made.
4) Traceability. Although no one knows how an end-
user will use power in the forthcoming period, a
power usage plan can be related to the corre-
sponding end-user at the end of the billing
period. This is necessary for the stability of power
grid and for the accuracy of charging bill calcula-
tion. Also this can lead to some deterrent effects
to attacking activities as the power company can
impose punishments to the users concerned upon
discovering attacking activities.
4 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we explain the concepts of public-key
encryption and digital signature, hash-based message
authentication code, homomorphic encryption, Bloom filter,
and commitment, respectively.
4.1 Public-Key Encryption and Digital Signature
Public-key encryption is a function provided by the public
key infrastructure and is also known as asymmetric encryp-
tion. A trusted party assigns each user a pair of public key
and private key. The public key can be known by everyone
while the private key is kept secret. To securely send a mes-
sage, the sender encrypts the message using the receiver’s
public key. The receiver can then obtain the message by
decrypting using the corresponding private key. RSA [23]
is a well-known algorithm for public-key encryption.
Throughout this paper, we denote the process of encrypting
plaintext M with public key PK to obtain ciphertext C as
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C ¼ ENCPKðMÞ. Similarly, we denote the process of
decrypting ciphertext C with private key SK to obtain
plaintext M as M ¼ DECSKðCÞ. In this paper, we assume
that any two parties can establish a secure channel using
PKI to minimize the impact of network-level attacks.
4.2 Hash-Based Message Authentication Code
Hash-based message authentication code is a specific con-
struction for computing a message authentication code
(MAC) using a cryptographic hash function in combination
with a secret key. Both data integrity and authenticity of a
message can be achieved using such a technique. Well-
known hash functions such as SHA-1 [24] and MD5 [25] can
be extended to produce an HMAC. Due to the nature of
hash functions, an HMAC value can be computed in a
much shorter time than a traditional digital signature.
Throughout this paper, we denote the HMAC value gener-
ated on messageM using the secret keyK asHMACKðMÞ.
4.3 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a special kind of encryption
having the following property. If we want to perform an
operation (e.g., to compute the sum) on the plain data but
these data are now encrypted, one can obtain the resulting
value by performing the computation on the encrypted val-
ues such that the one who carries out the computation can-
not know the values of the data, but the receiver is able to
decrypt and obtain the correct resulting answer. For exam-
ple, the homomorphic encryption used in Paillier cryptosys-
tem [26] has the following property. The encryption of the
sum of two numbers is equivalent to the product of the
encrypted values of the individual numbers. To be specific,
let the public key used for encryption in this system be
PK ¼ ðm; gÞ. Given two numbers x1 and x2. The encrypted
values of x1 and x2 are ENCPKðx1Þ ¼ gx1r1m and
ENCPKðx2Þ ¼ gx2r2m, respectively, where r1 and r2 are ran-
dom numbers. The product of the encrypted values of x1
and x2 is g
x1r1
m  gx2r2m ¼ gx1þx2ðr1r2Þm which is equiva-
lent to the encrypted value of x1 þ x2 (i.e., ENCPKðx1 þ x2Þ).
Therefore, Paillier cryptosystem carries the property of
homomorphic encryption: ENCPKðx1 þ x2Þ ¼ ENCPKðx1Þ
ENCPKðx2Þ. Having this property, a third party holding
encrypted numbers can help to compute their sum without
the need of first decrypting them or even knowing the num-
bers in advance.
4.4 Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter provides an efficient representation of a set
A ¼ a1; a2; . . . ; an of n elements to support membership
queries. The idea is to allocate a vector v with m bits,
initially all set to 0, and then choose k independent hash
functions, h1;h2;. . . ; hk, each with range 1; . . . ;m. For each
element a 2 A, the bits at the positions h1ðaÞ;h2ðaÞ;. . . ; hkðaÞ
in v are set to 1 (A particular bit might be set to 1 multiple
times). To answer if a value b is in A, we check the bits at
positions h1ðbÞ; h2ðbÞ;. . . ; hkðbÞ. If any of them is 0, then b is
definitely not in the set A. Otherwise we conjecture that b is
in the set although there is a certain probability that we are
wrong (called a false positive). After inserting n keys into
the vector with m bits with k hash functions, the probability
that a particular bit is still 0 is ð1 1mÞkn  e
kn
m assuming
that on any input value, the hash functions pick each
position with equal probability. Hence the probability of a
false positive is ð1 ð1 1mÞknÞk  ð1 e
kn
m Þk. Let fðkÞ ¼




dk ¼ 0, it can be shown that to minimize the
probability of having false positives, k should be set to mln2n .
On the other hand, as long as the functions used are one-
way functions, one cannot retrieve any information being
put into a bloom filter.
4.5 Commitment
A commitment scheme allows one party to commit to a value
while keeping it secret from the other party. At a later time,
the first party can reveal the committed value and prove to
the other party that this revealed value is the same as the
committed one. To achieve this purpose, two functions are
defined—Commitð:Þ and CheckRevealð:Þ The first function
takes a secret value and a commitment key as input and pro-
duces a commitment while the second function takes the
commitment, the value to be revealed and a decommitment
key as input and produces a positive or a negative answer.
Let us take a look at an example. Assume that Party A wants
to commit the valueX during his conversation with Party B.
Party A first generates a commitment and decommitment
keys, denoted by CKA and DKA respectively. Party A then
computes CA ¼ CommitðX;CKAÞ and sends it to Party B. At
a later time, Party A sends CA, X and DKA to Party B which
then invokes the function CheckRevealðCA;X;DKAÞ. RSA
with random padding [23] is a common implementation for
commitment functions. In this case, CKA and DKA form a
public and private key pair and are kept by Party A.
CA ¼ CommitðX;CKAÞ then becomes CA ¼ ENCCKAðXÞ.
CheckRevealðCA;X;DKAÞ thus involves the checking of
X ¼ DECDKAðCAÞ. Since by the property of RSA with ran-
dom padding, it is computationally hard to find two mes-
sages that can be encrypted to the same ciphertext, we can
conclude that Party A cannot modify X when revealing its
value to Party B.
5 OUR SOLUTION
This section presents our privacy-preserving recording and
gateway-assisted authentication of power usage information
for smart grid in details. Throughout this paper, we denote
the process of encrypting plaintextM with public key PK to
obtain ciphertext C, the process of decrypting ciphertext C
with private key SK to obtain plaintext M and the HMAC
value generated on message M using the secret key K as
C ¼ ENCPKðMÞ,M ¼ DECSKðCÞ andHMACKðMÞ, respec-
tively. On the other hand, to save space, we use a variable
without any subscript to represent a collection of the same
variable with subscripts. For example, we use Xs to repre-
sent a collection ofXi.
Our scheme contains four phases and we will discuss
them one by one:
1) Preparation phase. In this phase, the control center
sets up system parameters.
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2) Power plan submission phase. In this phase, a smart
meter submits power plans to request for additional
power or to express its intention to reduce power
usage. The control center cannot relate the power
plans to the actual users in this phase.
3) Power plan processing phase. In this phase, power
plans submitted by smart meters are processed by
their gateway smart meters and by the control
center.
4) Reconciliation phase. In this phase, a smart meter
needs to prove to the control center that its actual
power usage is consistent with the power plans sub-
mitted earlier.
5) System master secret updating phase. In this phase,
the control center updates the system master secret
in all non-compromised smart meters.
We first summarize the notations that will be used in this
paper in Table 1 to enhance readability. Then we will
describe each of these four phases one by one.
5.1 Preparation Phase
As discussed earlier, each household smart meter (located
at an end user’s home) or gateway smart meter (located at
different locations of the power transmission network) is
assumed to be tamper-resistant such that private keys and a
system master secret can be stored on them securely with-
out the worry of being tampered. Each tamper-resistant
device has a clock which runs on its own battery. These
clocks are assumed to be roughly synchronized.
The control center performs the following:
1) Generates its public and private keys by following
the property of Paillier cryptosystem [26] or any
other Homomorphic encryption cryptosystem. We
denote PKCC as its public key which is assumed to
be preloaded into all tamper-resistant devices. Such
a preloading process has been widely adopted in
studies that involve the use of tamper-resistant devi-
ces. [27] is an example. SKCC is its private key (corre-
sponding to PKCC) and is kept private.
2) Generates for each household smart meter HSMi an
identity HSMIDi, a pair of conventional public and
private keys by following the property of any PKI.
Let PKHSMi and SKHSMi be its public and private
keys respectively. <HSMIDi; PKHSMi > is stored
into the control center’s database while SKHSMi is
preloaded into the smart meter. These keys are used
for the purpose of initial transmission or updating of
system master secret (details will be discussed in the
last point).
3) Generates for each BAN gateway smart meter BSMi
an identity BSMIDi, a pair of conventional public
and private keys by following the property of any
PKI. Let PKBSMi and SKBSMi be its public and pri-
vate keys respectively. <BSMIDi; PKBSMi > is
stored into the control center’s database while
SKBSMi is preloaded into the smart meter. These
keys are used for the purpose of initial transmission
or updating of system master secret (details will be
discussed in the last point).
4) Generates for each NAN gateway smart meter NSMi
an identity NSMIDi, a pair of conventional public
and private keys by following the property of any
PKI. Let PKNSMi and SKNSMi be its public and pri-
vate keys respectively. <NSMIDi; PKNSMi > is
stored into the control center’s database while
SKNSMi is preloaded into the smart meter. These
keys are used for the purpose of initial transmission
or updating of system master secret (details will be
discussed in the next point).
5) Generates a system master secret s and securely
transmits it to each household smart meter HSMi,
each BAN gateway smart meter BSMi and each
NAN gateway smart meter NSMi by encrypting
using the corresponding PKHSMi , PKBSMi and
PKNSMi , respectively. At a later time and if there is a
neccessity (e.g., a smart meter is proved to be com-
promised), the control center can generate a new sys-
tem master secret and securely transmit it to each
non-compromised household or BAN gateway smart
meter in the same way.
5.2 Power Plan Submission Phase
An end user can request for additional power or to
express the intention to reduce power at any time (e.g.,
one-day ahead, one-week ahead or one-month ahead).
At this moment, the user smart meter HSMi performs
the following steps:
1) Prepares an array of entries: Ui ¼ ½ui0; ui1; . . . ; uiðn1Þ.
Here we assume that there are altogether n pre-
defined sub-periods in the forthcoming power
TABLE 1
Notations Used in this Paper
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provisioning period. For example, if we are using
one-day ahead power plan submission scheme, n
can be set to 24 and the basic unit becomes hour). uix
represents the amount of additional power required
(if it carries a positive value) or power reduction
agreed (if it carries a negative value) by the house-
hold smart meter HSMi in the xth sub-period. uix
can take up a zero value if the end user concerned
does not require additional power or does not want
any power reduction in the xth sub-period.
2) Encrypts each entry in the array using the control
center’s public key PKCC by incorporating randomly
generated numbers (as specified in Paillier crypto-
system [26] or any other Homomorphic encryption
cryptosystem standard) to form: Ei ¼ ½ei0; ei1; . . . ;
eiðn1Þ where eix ¼ ENCPKCC ðuixÞ. In this way, no
gateway smart meter can know the value of any uix.
3) Generates a pair of commitment and decommitment
keys and saves them locally. Without loss of general-
ity, let CKi be the commitment key and let DKi be
the corresponding de-commitment key.
4) Computes the hash of the array Ui together with its
identity HSMIDi and the current time stamp T as:
Hi ¼ hðHSMIDi; T; UiÞ.
5) CommitsHi to form: Ci ¼ CommitðHi; CKiÞ.
6) Computes the HMAC signature with the system
master secret s as the key on Ei, Hi and Ci to form
HMACsðEikHikCiÞ where k stands for simple
concatenation.
7) Sends ENCPKBSMj ðEi;Hi; Ci;HMACsðEikHikCiÞÞ to
its upper level BAN gateway smart meter BSMj.
8) Stores CKi,DKi, T , Ui and Ci locally.
In this paper, we only focus on the security require-
ment that a user’s power usage pattern is kept private
from anyone before he/she uses the power. In fact, a
user’s power usage pattern may still be inferred after the
control center has collected a large volume of power
usage information over time. As a future work, we will
investigate a possible solution to this problem. As a pre-
liminary idea, request messages from all users in a
region will be aggregated so that the utility can only get
the long-term usage trend of a region, but not of an indi-
vidual end user.
5.3 Power Plan Processing Phase
The BAN gateway smart meter BSMj does not forward the
received power plans from its lower level household smart
meters to its upper level NAN gateway smart meter imme-
diately. Instead, it only performs such a forwarding at regu-
lar intervals. For example, if one-day ahead scheme is
adopted, the BAN gateway forwards the plans to the NAN
gateway smart meter every mid-night. Without loss of gen-
erality, a BAN gateway smart meter should receive more
than one power plans during such an interval. Upon the
time of forwarding, BSMj performs the following steps:
1) For each ENCPKBSMj ðEi;Hi; Ci; HMACsðEikHik
CiÞÞ received, BSMj decrypts the block using its
private key SKBSMj and re-computes the HMAC
signature HMACsðEikHikCiÞ based on the
received Ei, Hi and Ci to see whether it is the
same as the one attached. This ensures that the
power usage plan is sent by a valid user smart
meter and also it is not modified by anyone. If the
computed value is not the same as the received
one, it simply drops the power plan message or
requests the household smart meter concerned to
re-submit its power usage plan.
2) Aggregates the received power usage plans by com-
puting the product of each array entry in Es to form:
AEj ¼ ½aej0; aej1; . . . ; aejðn1Þ where aejx ¼ e0x
e1x      eðm1Þx. Here we assume that there are
altogether m power plans received and to be
aggregated.
3) Prepares two bloom filters HBFj and CBFj (we will
discuss about how to set their size in Section 8.1.
BSMj then adds H0; H1;. . . ; Hm1 into HBFj and
adds C0, C1,. . . ; Cm1 into CBFj.
4) Computes the HMAC signature with the system
master secret s as the key on AEj, HBFj and CBFj to
form HMACsðAEjkHBFjkCBFjÞ where k stands for
simple concatenation.
5) Forwards ENCPKNSMk ðBSMIDj;AEj;HBFj; CBFj;
HMACs ðBSMIDjkAEjkHBFjkCBFjÞÞ to its upper
level NAN gateway smart meterNSMk.
To facilitate any user smart meter to check whether its
information is being aggregated by its upper level BAN
gateway smart meter BSMj, we require that the latest ver-
sion of AEj, HBFj and CBFj to be posted publicly and can
be downloaded by any user smart meter for checking at any
time. In this way, any user smart meter can keep track of
any change on the three aggregated values before and after
its power usage plan submission.
Upon receiving from multiple BANs, the upper level
NAN gateway smart meter NSMk performs the following
steps:
1) For each ENCPKNSMk ðBSMIDj;AEj;HBFj; CBFj;
HMACs ðBSMIDjkAEjkHBFjkCBFjÞÞ received,
NSMk decrypts the block using its private key
SKNSMk and re-computes the HMAC signature
HMACsðBSMIDjkAEjkHBFjkCBFjÞ based on the
received BSMIDj, AEj, HBFj and CBFj to see
whether it is the same as the one attached. This
ensures that the message is sent by a valid BAN gate-
way smart meter and also it is not modified by any-
one. If the computed value is not the same as the
received one, it simply drops the power plan mes-
sage or requests the BAN gateway smart meter con-
cerned to re-transmit the message.
2) Aggregates the received AEs in the same way as
what the BAN gateway smart meter does. That is, it
computes the product of each array entry in the AEs
received to form an aggregated array AAEk.
3) Computes the HMAC signature with the system
master secret s as the key on its identity NSMIDk,
AAEk, BSMIDs, HBFs and CBFs to form
HMACsðNSMIDkkAAEkkBSMID0kHBF0k CBF0k
BSMID1 kHBF1 kCBF1 k . . . kBSMIDp1 k HBFp1k
CBFp1Þ where k stands for simple concatenation
and p is the total number of HBFs and CBFs
received.
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4) Forwards ENCPKCC ðNSMIDk; AAEk; BSMID0;
HBF0; CBF0; BSMID1; HBF1; CBF1; . . . ; BSMIDp1;
HBFp1; CBFp1; HMACsðNSMIDk;AAEkkBSMID0k
HBF0kCBF0k BSMID1kHBF1kCBF1k . . . kBSMIDp1k
HBFp1kCBFp1ÞÞ to the control center.
Finally, the control center performs the following:
1) For eachENCPKCC ðNSMIDk;AAEk;BSMID0; HBF0;
CBF0; BSMID1; HBF1; CBF1; . . . ; BSMIDp1; HBFp1;
CBFp1; HMACsðNSMIDk; AAEkkBSMID0kHBF0k
CBF0 k BSMID1 k HBF1 kCBF1k . . . kBSMIDp1 k
HBFp1kCBFp1ÞÞ received, the control center
decrypts the block using its private key SKCC and re-
computes the HMAC signature HMACsðNSMIDk;
AAEkkBSMID0kHBF0 k CBF0 k BSMID1 kHBF1 k
CBF1 k . . . k BSMIDp1 k HBFp1k CBFp1Þ based
on the received NSMIDk, AAEk, BSMIDs, HBFs
and CBFs to see whether it is the same as the one
attached. This ensures that the message is sent by a
valid NAN gateway smart meter and also it is not
modified by anyone. If the computed value is not the
same as the received one, it simply drops the power
plan message or requests the NAN gateway smart
meter concerned to re-transmit themessage.
2) Aggregates the AAEs received in the same way as
what the BAN and NAN gateway smart meters do.
That is, it computes the product of each array entry
in the AAEs received. It then decrypts each entry in
the aggregation using its private key SKCC to obtain
the aggregated power demand information in each
sub-period.
3) Stores <BSMIDj;HBFj; CBFj > for each BSMj
into its own database for use in the reconciliation
phase (details will be discussed in the next section).
Note that BANs may not exist in some real-world
advanced metering infrastructure deployments nowadays.
In this case, our scheme works in almost the same way
except that there is no more aggregation at BAN gateway
smart meters and the two bloom filters HBFj and CBFj are
now prepared by the upper level NAN gateway smart
meter NSMk.
5.4 Reconciliation Phase
This phase is carried out at the end of each billing
period. The control center requests each household smart
meter to prove that it has submitted a certain power
plan earlier. Such a proof is essential for two reasons.
First, for end users who have used additional power
without making request beforehand, penalties should be
assessed. Second, for end users who have agreed to use
less power and can actually use less power, discounts
should be offered on their electricity bills.
Having received the request, an end user responds by
sending its identity SMIDi, the time stamp used T , the orig-
inal array Ui, the commitment Ci and the de-commitment
keyDKi to the control center.
The control center then performs the following steps:
1) Computes Hi ¼ hðSMIDi; T; UiÞ and ensures that
both Hi and Ci are in the aggregated bloom filters
HBFj and CBFj, respectively, submitted by its
corresponding BAN gateway smart meter BSMj.
Note that mapping HSMi to BSMj is simple in a
smart grid network since the geographical location
of any end user is fixed.
2) Verifies the commitment information by invoking
the function CheckRevealðCi;Hi;DKiÞ to see
whether it returns a positive value.
3) If yes, compares the agreed power plan and the
actual power usage (to be physically measured by
the smart meter like what the kWh meter does nowa-
days) of that end user to see whether they match. If
not, penalties or additional charge will be imposed
on the end user.
5.5 System Master Secret Updating Phase
Our scheme provides a mechanism for updating the system
master secret s in case the control center believes that any
smart meter has been compromised (e.g., by means of the
software attestation protocol in [21]). Preliminary physical
investigations may also be involved.
Assume that the control center wants to update the
system master secret from s to s0. It finds the public keys
of all smart meters except the one that has been compro-
mised. For each of such smart meter SMi, it composes
the message ENCPKSMi ðs0Þ together with its signature
SIGSKCC ðENCPKSMi ðs0ÞÞ.
Upon receiving the key update message, SMi’s TPM first
verifies the signature of the control center using the public
key PKCC . Then it decrypts the message using its own pri-
vate key SKSMi to obtain s
0 and then replaces the old
regional system key with the new one.
The time complexity of this key update procedure may
be high but it can be carried out during non-peak hours
(e.g., in the early morning). Also this phase can be applied
to all household smart meters, BAN gateway smart meters
and NAN gateway smart meters.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyse our scheme with respect to the security require-
ments listed in Section 3.
1) Power plan message authentication. Before a smart
meter transmits a request message to the control cen-
ter, it has to include an HMAC signature on the
encrypted message (i.e., Ei) using a system master
secret s. This system master secret is only preloaded
into all valid smart meters. Assuming that smart
meters are tamper-resistant, this systemmaster secret
cannot be retrieved by an attacker easily. Hence an
outside attacker (who is not a valid smart meter) does
not know how to generate a valid HMAC signature.
Thus our scheme is protected from outsider attacks.
It is true that a compromised tamper-resistant
device can still launch attacks (known as insider
attacks) to the system since it possesses the system
master secret s. However, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.1, our scheme provides a way for the control
center to update the system master secret using sim-
ple PKI. In addition, the new system key is sent in
encrypted form to all non-compromised devices.
The tamper-resistant device that is compromised
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cannot get it. Also, the control center can set a bound
for different types of users (e.g., domestic or com-
mercial) to avoid a user requesting a huge amount of
power as an insider attack.
2) Privacy preservation of future power usage plan. In
the power plan submission phase (Section 5.2), an end
user’s power usage plan is encrypted using the con-
trol center’s public key PKCC before sending to the
BAN gateway smart meter. The BAN gateway smart
meter then aggregates the power usage plans of mul-
tiple end users using the technique of homomorphic
encryption though it does not know how to decrypt
them. At the control center side, it can decrypt using
its private key SKCC the aggregate amount of power
usage in each sub-period. It cannot know the power
usage plan of any individual end user.
Besides the aggregated power usage, the control
center also receives bloom filters containing Hi and
Ci submitted by each household smart meter SMi.
However, by the property of bloom filter, one cannot
retrieve any information being put into a bloom fil-
ter. Therefore, the control center obtains no informa-
tion about any end user’s power usage (even Hi and
Ci values) from the bloom filters. The privacy of any
end user’s future power usage is thus preserved.
3) Non-repudiation of power usage plan. At the end of a
billing period (during the Reconciliation Phase in Sec-
tion 5.4), an end user has to send its identity SMIDi,
the time stamp used T , the original array Ui, the com-
mitment Ci and the de-commitment key DKi to the
control center. By the property of RSA, it is hard to
find two messages that can be encrypted to the same
ciphertext. Thus an end user cannot commit another
power usage plan and generate the same commitment.
Also the end user involved is the only partywho holds
the decommitment keyDKi which corresponds to the
commitment key CKi used to generate the commit-
ment. Therefore, as long as an end user needs to sub-
mit a proof, he/she cannot deny any power usage
plan submitted or cannot argue that it has made a cer-
tain power usage planwhich it has not actuallymade.
It is true that an end user can deny submitting any
proof (i.e., deny opening its previously submitted
commitment). However, this is of his/her own dis-
advantage. For additional power usage request, the
power operator simply treats him/her as using addi-
tional power without making request. Penalties
result. For agreement of power saving, the power
operator simply treats him/her of not submitting
any agreement of power saving. No discount is
given to his/her electricity bill as a result.
4) Traceability. At the end of a billing period (during
the reconciliation phase in Section 5.4), an end user
has to send its identity SMIDi to the control center.
Thus the control center can issue correct charging
bills to each end user.
7 ANALYSIS OF TIME COMPLEXITY
In this section, we briefly analyze the time complexity of our
scheme. Note that we ignore the time complexity involved
in preparation phase and system master secret updating
phase since they can be done offline and are only done once
occasionally (e.g., when the control center wants to update
the system master secret). It is not critical to the efficiency of
our scheme.
Let Thenc denote the time required to perform one homo-
morphic encryption, Thdec the time required to perform one
homomorphic decryption, Tenc the time required to perform
one conventional asymmetric encryption, Tdec the time
required to perform one conventional asymmetric decryp-
tion, Tsig the time required to perform one digital signature,
Thash the time required to perform one hash computation,
Thmac the time required to perform one HMAC computa-
tion, Tcommkeygen the time to generate a commitment and
decommitment key pair, Tcomm the time to compute commit-
ment, Tvercomm the time to verify a commitment, Tmul the
time to compute the product of two real numbers, Tpbf the
time to add a number into a bloom filter and Tcbf the time to
check whether a number is in a bloom filter. Note that con-
ventional asymmetric encryption can actually be done in a
hybrid manner. That is, a message is first symmetrically
encrypted using a session key, which is then asymmetrically
encrypted using the receiver’s public key. Similarly conven-
tional asymmetric decryption can also be done in a hybrid
manner. That is, the receiver first performs asymmetrically
decryption using his/her private key to obtain the session
key, which is then used for symmetric decryption to obtain
the message. Based on similar ideas, digital signature can
also be done in a hybrid manner. That is, a message is first
hashed into a fixed output, which is then digitally signed
using the sender’s private key.
We implemented all these functions onto an old-fash-
ioned computer with processor speed 750 MHz and RAM
size 4 GB. This hardware configuration is roughly equiva-
lent to that of FriendlyARM [28], which is a possible micro-
controller platform for implementing smart meters. We
adopted Paillier cryptosystem with 512 bits of modulus and
at least 1 264 certainty of primes generation for homo-
morphic encryption and decryption, RSA with 1,024 bits
key for asymmetric encryption, decryption, digitial signa-
ture, commitment generation and verification, AES with
128 bits key for symmetric encryption and decryption, and
MD5 algorithm for hash and HMAC computation. We sum-
marize the average time required (over 10 experiments) for
each of the above operations in Table 2.
According to Section 5.2, the user smart meter HSMi
takes time n Thenc to produce Ei, Tcommkeygen to generate a
commitment and decommitment key pair, Thash to compute
Hi, Tcomm to obtain Ci and, and Thmac to compute the final
HMAC signature. As such, the total time required is
38:2nþ 577:6þ 0:4þ 812:4þ 0:4 ¼ 38:2nþ 1390:8 msec. For
example, if n ¼ 24, the total time required becomes 2307.6
msec which is about 2.3 sec.
According to Section 5.3, the BAN gateway smart meter
BSMj takes time Thmac to re-compute the HMAC signature,
m n Tmul to aggregate power usage plans, 2m Tpbf to
add hash and commitment values into bloom filters, and
Thmac to compute HMAC signature. As such, the total time
required is 0:4þ 0:2mnþ 0:2mþ 0:4 ¼ 0:2mnþ 0:2mþ 0:8
msec. For example, if n ¼ 24 and m ¼ 100, the total time
required becomes 500.8 msec which is about 0.5 sec.
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Similarly, the NAN gateway smart meter NSMk takes time
Thmac to re-compute the HMAC signature, m n Tmul to
aggregate power usage plans (assuming messages from m
BAN gateway smart meters are received), and Thmac to com-
pute HMAC signature. As such, the total time required is
0:4þ 0:2mnþ 0:4 ¼ 0:2mnþ 0:8 msec. For example, if
n ¼ 24 and m ¼ 100, the total time required becomes
480.8 msec which is about 0.5 sec. The control center
takes time Thmac to re-compute the HMAC signature,
m n Tmul to aggregate power usage plans (assuming
messages frommNAN gateway smart meters are received),
and n Thdec to obtain the aggregated power demand infor-
mation in each sub-period. As such, the total time required
is 0:4þ 0:2mnþ 97:1n ¼ 0:2mnþ 97:1nþ 0:4 msec. For
example, if n ¼ 24 and m ¼ 100, the total time required
becomes 2810.8 msec which is about 2.8 sec.
According to Section 5.4, for each user, the control cen-
ter takes time Thash to compute Hi, 2 Tcbf to check
whether Hi and Ci are in the aggregated bloom filters
HBFj and CBFj, and Tvercomm to verify the commitment
made by a user. As such, the total time required is 0:4þ
0:2þ 9:0 ¼ 9:6 msec.
8 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
8.1 Discussion on Bloom Filter Approach
This section analyses our proposed bloom filter approach
for the BAN and NAN gateway smart meters to aggre-
gate H and C values from household smart meters. We
show that the probability of having false positives is
very small if we set the parameters for the bloom filters
appropriately.
The probabily of having a false positive in our bloom fil-
ter apporach is equal to the probability that all k bits are set
in the bloom filter. Thus such a probability is PrðPF Þ ¼
ð1 ð1 1mÞknÞk  ð1 e
kn
m Þk. This probability can be mini-
mized when k ¼ mln2n . Hence we set the number of hash
functions to mln2n in our scheme and PrðPF Þ  ð0:6185Þ
m
n . We
represent this function graphically in Fig. 2. It can be shown
that when mn ¼ 5, PrðPF Þ is about 0.09. When mn ¼ 10,
PrðPF Þ drops to 0.008 only. Therefore, we suggest users to
set the size of bloom filters to 10 times the number of house-
holds for which the information will be put into the bloom
filters. For example, if a building contains 200 households,
the size of HBFs and CBFs should be set to 2,000 bits
(i.e., 250 bytes).
8.2 Experimental Results
This section explains our experimental results. In our
experiments, we consider a virtual city like Hong Kong for
which by 2011, there were 2,367,000 households and about
7,000 buildings [29]. We roughly fine-tune these numbers to
reflect the situation in cities of different population densi-
ties. To be concise, we vary the number of households from
1 to 10 millions while fixing the number of buildings to
7,000. We then investigate the gain in terms of total traffic
volume by our gateway-assisted aggregation approach. We
also repeat this experiment by varying the number of sub-
periods from 4 to 48. Next, we introduce some attacking
traffic into the network and show that our gateway-assisted
authentication approach is effective in minimizing its
impact. Note that all previous efforts have different security
assumptions from ours. For example, [1] and [2] only con-
siders message authentication issue but not end user pri-
vacy preservation issue. It is difficult to directly compare
with them. Therefore, in our experiments below, we just
compare our scheme with and without aggregation and fil-
tering at gateway smart meters.
In the first experiment, we fix the number of sub-periods
to 24 and vary the number of households from 1 to 10 mil-
lions in steps of 1 million and investigate its impact on the
total traffic volume with and without aggregation at gate-
way smart meters. The result is shown in Fig. 3. It is found
that the total traffic volume increases linearly with the num-
ber of households. This is normal as more power usage
plans are submitted when there are more households in the
city. Aggregation at gateway smart meters yields significant
decrease in the total traffic volume. No matter how the
number of households varies, the total traffic volume with
aggregation is about 66 percent lower than that without
aggregation. This shows that aggregation at gateway smart
meters is helpful in reducing the total traffic volume.
Next, we fix the number of households to 2 millions (i.e.,
roughly the statistics in Hong Kong) and vary the number of
sub-periods from four to 48 in steps of 4 and investigate
its impact on the total traffic volume with and without
aggregation at gateway smart meters. Obviously, with more
TABLE 2
Average Time Required for Each Function
Fig. 2. Pr(PF) with different values of m/n.
Fig. 3. Total traffic volume versus number of households.
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sub-periods defined, an end user’s power usage plan can
reflect his/her actual power usagemore accurately. For exam-
ple, if an end user requires additional power for just 1 hour
but there are only 4 sub-periods defined in a day (i.e., 6 hours
in each sub-period), a waste of 5 hours’ additional power will
be resulted. The result is shown in Fig. 4. It is found that the
total traffic volume increases linearly with the number of sub-
periods. This is normal asmore power usage prediction infor-
mation is submitted when there are more sub-periods
defined. Aggregation at gateway smart meters yields signifi-
cant decrease in the total traffic volume. No matter how the
number of sub-periods varies, the total traffic volume with
aggregation is about 66 percent lower than that without
aggregation. This again shows that aggregation at gateway
smartmeters is helpful in reducing the total traffic volume.
Finally, we consider the case that there are some attackers
in the smart grid network. We fix the number of households
to 2 millions and the number of sub-periods to 24. We then
introduce different numbers of attackers into the network
and investigate how many households are affected with and
without message filtering at gateway smart meters. We con-
sider a household is affected if its message to the control cen-
ter experiences any network congestion or even packet
dropping. Due to the nature of our scheme, having different
numbers of attackers inside the same building yields no dif-
ference in terms of performance. Therefore, we assume that
the attackers are evenly distributed into different buildings
in the city. For example, if there are 10 attackers, we assume
that they are evenly distributed into 10 different buildings.
Without message filtering at gateway smart meters, all
traffic from attackers will be forwarded to the control center.
Thus the control center becomes a single point of failure and
cannot handle (or can only handle at lower speed) power
usage plans submitted by normal users. As a result, almost
all households in the city are affected. With message filter-
ing at BAN gateway smart meters, traffic from attackers are
filtered at the building level. As a result, only households
located in the same building as the attacker are affected.
The control center and thus households located in buildings
without attacker will not be affected at all. We summarize
this result in Fig. 5. This shows that message filtering at
gateway smart meters is helpful in reducing the impact of
attacking traffic.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a scheme for privacy-preserving
recording and gateway-assisted authentication of power
usage information for the smart grid network. By observing
that gateway smart meters are usually physically harder to
be compromised, they are utilized to help authenticate
messages sent by household smart meters before these mes-
sages actually reach the control center. We assume that
smart meters are tamper-resistant devices which are secure
from data cracking or operation disturbance. A major fea-
ture of our scheme is that the privacy of any end user, espe-
cially their future power usage plan, can be preserved while
at the same time the control center can generate a proper
amount of electricity. That is, our scheme allows the control
center to record an end user’s additional power request or
power reduction plan one day ahead, one week ahead, one
month ahead or even one year ahead anonymously. This
goal is achieved using the concept of cryptographic commit-
ment. On the other hand, our scheme allows gateway smart
meters to aggregate power usage plans from multiple
household smart meters. This goal is achieved using the
techniques of homomorphic encryption and bloom filter.
Through experimental study, we show that aggregation at
gateway smart meters can help reduce the total traffic vol-
ume by 66 percent. On the other hand, message filtering at
BAN gateway smart meters can help to significantly reduce
the impact of attacking traffic. In particular, only house-
holds in buildings with attackers are affected.
Note that the two security issues we address are the first
step towards a secure smart grid system. Further investiga-
tion probably would come up with better solutions and
other security issues (e.g., DDoS attacks) need to be
addressed and integrated into the system. We will also
study possible privacy leakage caused when the control
center has built up long-term load profiles of end users. In
this paper, we assume that TPM is tamper-resistant such
that keys stored in them are difficult to be cracked or modi-
fied. We will have an in-depth investigation about how to
achieve this assumption in the future. We are now in the
process of collecting statistics on real power usage. We
believe that if we have such statistics, we could perform a
more realistic simulation in the future. Besides, we are con-
sidering other secure applications in smart grid networks.
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